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Mainstreaming Social Finance: The Regulation of the Peer-to-Peer Lending 
Marketplace in the United Kingdom 
 
Chris Rogers and Chris Clarke 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper provides one of the first political economy accounts of the regulation of 
peer-to-peer (P2P) lending in the UK, drawing on interviews with platforms 
representing the vast majority of the market at the beginning of the regulatory process. 
The article links the regulation of P2P lending with debates about regulatory capture. It 
challenges conventional understandings of its consequences by showing how the 
regulation of P2P lending displays characteristics of regulatory capture, but appears to 
have realised several aspects of regulators' visions for a 'socially useful finance', rather 
than facilitating the kind of rent-seeking behaviour that has been identified in the case of 
other areas of finance. P2P lending is found to represent one of the latest forms of 
consumer and small business finance that works towards so-called ‘financial inclusion’, 
with ambiguous social outcomes that necessitate further critical investigation.  
Keywords: Peer-to-Peer Lending; regulatory capture; socially useful finance; 
marketplace lending; financial innovation.  
  
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years, a great deal of attention has been paid to the regulation and re-
regulation of financial activity, especially in the UK.  This scholarship has included 
critical analyses of the financial system as a whole (Ertürk et al 2012) and studies of the 
shift towards a macroprudential regulatory agenda (Baker 2012), which in combination 
have brought to the fore the importance of questioning the social purpose of finance.  
However, as Baker (2014, 43) has noted, ‘there has been a singular reluctance in the 
technocratic macroprudential community to connect to wider questions concerning the 
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social purpose of finance.’  Similarly, much academic literature has left a blind spot with 
regards to potentially more ‘socially useful’ types of finance.  This omission is striking 
given the rapid growth of various forms of finance attempting to offer meaningful 
alternatives to high street banks, including ‘fintech’ in general and the peer-to-peer (P2P) 
lending sector in particular.    
 
In this article we address that blind spot by considering the ways in which the regulation 
of P2P lending in the UK has contributed to the growth of socially useful finance, as 
defined by leading regulatory figures.  We build upon critiques of financial regulation, 
which have suggested it is characterised by ‘capture’ (Baker 2010) or ‘elite collusion’ 
(Cerny 2013) to make three core arguments.  First, the transition from self-regulation to 
formal regulation in the P2P lending sector can be interpreted as an instance of 
‘regulatory capture’ characterised by a degree of elite collusion. To make this case, we 
engage with literature outlining the conditions under which influential policy 
communities are formed and regulatory capture is understood to occur (inter alia Grant 
2005; Mattli & Woods 2009; Tsingou 2009; Pagliari 2012), and suggest that core 
conditions for capture can be identified in the case of the emerging P2P sector.  Second, 
the key outcome of the regulatory moment was performative, reflecting the view that 
regulations not only manage but also render objects as governable (Aitken 2015, 132).  
This performativity is manifested in the fact that formal regulation granted the P2P 
industry ‘a sanctioned claim to formal legitimacy’, which has been described as ‘key to 
financial power’ (ibid., 129).  Finally, regulatory capture has been a key driver in allowing 
the sector to meet some of the regulators’ aspirations for socially useful finance, as they 
define it.   
 
The final point alludes to the ambiguous notion of public interest, which, as Mattli and 
Woods (2009, 13) note, is subject to ‘no generally agreed meaning’. We provisionally 
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mobilise an understanding of socially useful finance—a proxy for the public interest in 
finance—directly from a set of debates about the links between finance and society in 
general, and its ability to ‘lubricate the flows of capital and trade’ and connect ‘savers to 
productive investments’ (Turner 2009b), which has been stimulated by key UK 
regulatory figures. These figures include Adair Turner, former Chairman of the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, 
and Andrew Haldane, Executive Director of Financial Stability at the Bank.  We suggest 
that the recent growth of P2P lending meets some of their criteria for constituting a 
more socially useful finance.  On this basis, we suggest that it may be legitimate to think 
of ‘constructive’ regulatory capture in instances where the aims of financial innovators 
align with broad conceptions about the social purpose of finance, especially given the 
importance of regulation for legitimating financial practices in the eyes of users.   
 
Our aim, of course, is not to endorse regulatory capture in general, but to identify some 
potential benefits in this specific case, and we suggest that whether or not such regulation 
does in fact produce ‘socially useful’ outcomes could only be assessed in light of further 
reflection on what socially useful finance is, and through historical reflection about the 
role of P2P lending in realising it. We therefore point to the fact that the criteria 
outlined by regulators are limited in ambition, and that the notion of what is ‘socially 
useful’ requires further consideration.  We are also conscious that it is not necessarily 
helpful to artificially juxtapose socially useful alternative forms of finance with ‘socially 
useless’ banking, but suggest that emphasising ‘social usefulness’ represents one way to 
think differently about the way in which we do finance.   Our conclusions draw attention 
to the nature of the sector’s potential to realise socially useful finance and offers a 
research agenda that can help explore this aim, while cautioning against some of the 
consequences of mainstreaming another form of consumer debt within the UK’s 
financialised economy.  
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The article is a qualitative study.  It draws on material from trade bodies, the press, 
think-tanks, and interviews with the founders of the UK’s three largest P2P lending 
platforms (Funding Circle, Ratesetter, and Zopa), and the Executive Director of the 
industry’s trade association, the Peer-to-Peer Finance Association (P2PFA).1  While the 
absolute number of interviews is small, the firms discussed represented almost 100 per 
cent of the market share at the beginning of 2011 when the regulatory process began, 
and despite a number of new entrants, still account for nearly 62 per cent of the 
market.2 In the first section, we review literature discussing the social purpose of finance 
and discussions of financial regulation that show how it has often been characterised as 
subject to capture, which is usually associated with the development of socially useless 
finance.  In the second section, we review the transition from self-regulation to formal 
regulation of the P2P sector.  We show how the primary drivers of formal regulation lie 
within the sector itself and how it closely mirrors the self-regulation that went before it.  
We argue that this reflection can be interpreted as a form of regulatory capture.  In the 
final section, we argue that, in contrast to where regulatory capture has been associated 
with rent-seeking, in the case of P2P lending it appears to provide reputational value to 
a form of finance that meets some of the criteria for socially useful finance, as defined 
by regulators. The conclusion summarises the argument and briefly reflects on areas for 
future research into the P2P lending sector.  
 
1. The State of Regulation 
 
                                                        
1 All participants were sent information sheets prior to interviews and transcripts of 
interviews after they had taken place.  They have provided written confirmation that 
transcripts are accurate reflections of the meetings and that they are happy to be cited as 
such.  
2 see http://www.altfi.com/data/indices/UKvolume 
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Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) much of the discussion about financial 
regulation has focused on the form that regulation has taken, and engaged in critique by 
demonstrating the ways in which regulatory responses to periods of crisis have not 
historically served to create systemic stability.  Perhaps more significantly, it has been 
argued that powerful financial actors have been able to capture regulation in order to 
facilitate rent-seeking opportunities that give finance the characteristic of what some 
have labelled a ‘club good’—a good that is artificially scarce and allows benefits to be 
realised by particular actors in a system that tends towards monopoly rather than 
competition. This section briefly reviews this literature in order to frame our core 
argument: the regulation of the P2P lending marketplace in the UK can be characterised 
by capture but has granted reputational value to a form of finance that delivers on some 
regulators’ aspirations for a more socially useful type of finance, rather than facilitating 
the kind of rent-seeking that has been identified in the case of other areas of financial 
activity.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the GFC, one of the most significant debates about 
financial regulation related to the balance between microprudential and macroprudential 
concerns. As Alessandri and Haldane (2009, 9-10) noted, microprudential, firm-level 
approaches to regulation made sense for firms in isolation, but made many financial 
institutions more alike and therefore amplified ‘the system’s sensitivity to aggregate 
fluctuations.’  In contrast, ‘a macro-prudential approach to regulation considers the 
systemic implications of the collective behaviour of financial firms’ and generates 
stability from ‘the heterogeneity of the financial system’ (Warwick Commission 2009, 
13).  The extent to which an acceptance of the macroprudential paradigm became 
quickly established in policy-making circles has been described as a rapid ideational shift 
(Baker 2012). 
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At a superficial level, macroprudential regulation attempts to create a more stable 
financial system.  However, at a more substantial level, it also directs attention away 
from questions about the purpose of finance, because it does not discuss the origins of 
crisis in relation to the kinds of financial activity proliferated, but simply in terms of the 
way in which they are managed. This analysis opens the door to a major critique of 
financial regulation: that it focuses on regulative rather than constitutive rules, and that it 
takes a synchronic rather than a diachronic perspective (Rethel and Sinclair 2012).   As 
Rethel and Sinclair (2012, 24) argue, constitutive rules are those that define new forms 
of behaviour, geared towards defining the purpose of an activity, whereas regulative 
rules are focused on existing forms of behaviour and relate to the conduct of that 
behaviour.  Synchronic perspectives, they note, focus on regulation at a single point in 
time, while diachronic perspectives on regulation take account of much more complex 
social processes over a period of time (Rethel and Sinclair 2012, 25).  Rethel and 
Sinclair’s analysis therefore juxtaposes the ideal constitutive/diachronic form of 
regulation with the sub-optimal regulative/synchronic form of regulation.  Ultimately, 
the tendency for regulation to take the latter form has raised the question of whether or 
not bank-based finance ‘actually serves a purpose other than to enrich the bankers 
involved’ (Rethel and Sinclair 2012, 127). 
 
Echoing this critique of regulative/synchronic regulation, Adair Turner made a series of 
public interventions that questioned the social purpose of finance following the crisis 
(see Turner 2016, xiii-xiv).  In August 2009 he stated: ‘It is hard is to distinguish 
between valuable financial innovation and non-valuable … I think that some of it is 
socially useless activity’ (Turner 2009a).  These remarks proved controversial within the 
City – particularly given that Turner was the Chairman of the FSA at the time – yet he 
went on to defend them a month later in his Mansion House speech: ‘some financial 
activities which proliferated over the last ten years were “socially useless”, and some 
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parts of the system were swollen beyond their optimal size’, and cited Stephen Green, 
Chairman of the British Bankers’ Association, who said that the chasing of short-term 
profits had led to ‘complex products of no real use to humanity’ and that ‘some parts of 
our industry have become overblown’ (Turner 2009b). In a recent book, Turner (2016, 
11) elaborated this thinking further to suggest that public policy should aim to produce 
‘potentially more socially valuable forms of credit allocation’ than that which results 
from ‘purely private decisions’. The main argument of the book is that it is possible to 
have ‘too much finance’ and that the ‘excessive scale’ of some financial activity is what 
leads to moments of crisis (Turner 2016, xiv; 43).3 
 
The thrust of Turner’s interventions on the question of social usefulness have been 
echoed by other key regulatory figures.  For instance, Haldane (2012) suggested that 
whereas British banks were once part of the ‘social fabric’, that fabric has now been 
‘torn’ and banks ‘need to rediscover their social usefulness’.  Similarly, Carney (cited in 
Inham 2013) has suggested that when finance ‘only talks to itself … [it] becomes socially 
useless’. Despite these claims and the short-term alarm of the City when they were first 
made, the early regulatory position outlined in 2009 and addressed by the Coalition 
Government since 2010 has, if anything, left this debate about social purpose behind.  
Indeed, the Independent Commission on Banking Standards, the Financial Services Act 
2012, the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, and a number of official 
consultations did very little in terms of delivering on the specific issue of social purpose.  
Instead, the focus tended to be on regulatory and prudential issues in the name of 
financial stability, diluting calls for urgent reform to make finance meet a social purpose. 
                                                        
3 It is noteworthy that Turner does not elaborate precisely what he takes to be ‘social usefulness’ but 
instead seems to rely on basic points about finance having become too large and ‘swollen’, and it is 
somewhat unusual that Turner does not substantially address recent developments in alternative forms of 
credit allocation, such as P2P lending. In fact, in February 2016 Turner explicitly warned that losses on 
P2P loans had the potential to ‘make the worst bankers look like absolute lending geniuses’ (Rovnick 
2016), suggesting a degree of tension between his prior ideas about the social usefulness of intermediation 
and his position on and emerging forms of intermediated finance like P2P.   
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This dilution of aims can be understood primarily in terms of the institutional market 
power of financial actors.   
 
Baker (2010) identifies a key driver of this process in the form of regulatory capture.  
This capture happens ‘when bureaucrats, regulators and politicians cease to serve some 
notion of a wider collective public interest and begin to systematically favour specific 
vested interests’ (Baker 2010, 648).  Baker (2010, 649) notes how this process was 
particularly prevalent in the US and the UK in the 1990s and 2000s as a ‘largely 
unregulated shadow banking sector’ was allowed to emerge on the basis of ‘originate to 
distribute’ models of risk management, which were managed by financial institutions in-
house.  In the case of banking, Baker (2010, 651) argues that the material resources of 
financial institutions, in combination with the political importance of regulation, a 
‘revolving door’ between regulators and financial institutions, and the establishment of 
an intellectual paradigm about banking all went increasingly unchallenged.  
 
This critique has been echoed by Cerny (2013, 12), who has argued that ‘national states 
are caught up in a quasi-corporatist bargaining process that privileges the best resourced 
and entrenched private interests’, which produces regulation formed on the basis of 
intellectual capture (Cerny 2013, 16). He suggests that while the financial sector has 
been traditionally characterised as a ‘private good’, it should in fact be characterised as a 
‘club good’, which is non-rival (a key characteristic of public goods), but also excludable 
(a key characteristic of private goods) such that it can be subject to elite collusion and 
institutionalised rent-seeking.  Cerny (2013 16-7) argues the ‘collusive character’ of such 
club goods is intensified because they are often ‘provided under the aegis and 
“constitutive” charter of the state’ and which results in ‘pro-market regulation’ that is 
amenable to ‘collusion, market manipulation, and increased rent-seeking’.  
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Discussions of financial regulation since the GFC have therefore placed emphasis on 
the way in which the privileged position of financial institutions has allowed them to 
extract benefits for themselves, resulting in systemic instability and the socialisation of 
the costs of failure.  The implication is that regulatory capture not only had a significant 
role to play in the origins of the GFC, but that it is also playing an important role in the 
restoration of the status quo ante (Tsingou 2009) and by implication, institutionalising 
future instability.  In order to prevent such outcomes, it is necessary to go back to 
Turner and other regulators’ considerations of what a socially useful finance might look 
like, and how it should be regulated to ensure it is able to meet that social purpose.   
 
While such discussions have been somewhat sparse, the statements of regulators such as 
Turner suggests that they view it as finance constituted by activity that is traditionally 
conceived as financial intermediation, narrowly defined.  As Turner (2009b) puts it, the 
socially useful functions of finance are ‘linking savers to productive investments, 
allocating capital to efficient use, [and] lubricating the flows of capital and trade’.  He 
recognises of course that it is not straightforward to distinguish this supposedly socially 
valuable element from ‘pure speculation’ and that market making requires ‘some 
position taking’ (Turner 2009b).  Yet, there is still a sense that, on these terms, socially 
useful finance is about something to do with linking savings with borrowers and 
productive investments according to a model of traditional financial intermediation.  As 
Carney (cited in Inham 2013) claims, the question of social purpose is one of what 
finance ‘does for businesses making investment, what ultimately it means for jobs in the 
economy’. 
 
The image of socially useful finance regulators present is clearly limited.  For instance, it 
does not explicitly address the kinds of banking activity that might be described as 
socially useless, and while it might be assumed this is a reference to developments in 
 10 
securitisation and of banks’ highly leveraged positions, it says little about other core 
functions of banks, such as their role in money creation.  Equally, the vision of social 
usefulness presented by regulators fails to seriously address questions about the social 
character of money and debt and in particular questions about what money ‘is’ and what 
it is ‘for’ (inter alia Dodd 2014; Graeber, 2011; Zelizer 1994). On the one hand, the 
position of regulators on socially useful finance makes it difficult to distinguish a 
meaningful critique of financial activity from generalised ‘bank-bashing’, while on the 
other, to accept the premise that ‘finance’ has a ‘function’ or ‘purpose’ may serve to 
blunt critique of ‘it’ (Scott 2013, 20). It is clear then, that the notion of ‘socially useful 
finance’ is presently underdeveloped and requires further research that is beyond the 
present scope of this paper.   
 
Our intention is not, therefore, to endorse regulators’ views about what constitutes 
‘socially useful finance’, but to show how the dynamics of regulatory capture that have 
so often been criticised for producing socially useless finance have, in the specific case 
of the P2P sector in the UK, unintentionally helped to realise regulators’ visions of what 
constitutes socially useful finance.  Therefore, our argument that the emergence of 
socially useful finance defined in these terms has emerged from regulatory capture 
suggests that in certain instances, it may be useful to think of instances of ‘constructive’ 
capture, which could only be confirmed through historical enquiry.  The next section of 
the paper reflects on the conditions that lead to capture, and the extent to which the 
regulation of the P2P sector meets these criteria.   
 
2. From Self-Regulation to Formal Regulation 
 
It is broadly accepted that there are some common conditions that lead to the formation 
of policy communities, which can result in policy monopolies or regulatory capture.  
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These include asymmetries of information between the regulated industry and regulators 
and society more broadly, a lack of widespread public interest in regulation in a given 
sphere, the apparently technical nature of the subject of regulation, as well as particular 
institutional and political contexts (Grant 2005; Mattli and Woods 2009; Tsingou 2009; 
Pagliari 2012).  In particular, Mattli and Woods (2009, 5) have suggested that the 
tendency for regulatory capture can be thought of as a function of the relationship 
between the institutional supply of and social demand for regulation.  This section of 
the paper will show how it is possible to observe limited institutional supply and weak 
social demand for the regulation of the P2P marketplace in the UK, and therefore 
demonstrates that the regulation of the P2P marketplace in the UK can be characterised 
as an instance of regulatory capture.  
 
In recent years there has been impressive growth in various alternative forms of 
financial activity that exploit new technologies in order to connect lenders and 
borrowers outside established banking and investment practices (Nesta 2014).  For the 
purposes of this article, we are concerned with P2P lending only. This form of 
crowdfunding, if it can be called that, is distinct from many others because it is the only 
form that focuses on lending and borrowing specifically. In contrast, ‘donation 
crowdfunding’ can be characterised as philanthropy, while both ‘reward’ and ‘equity 
crowdfunding’ can be characterised as a form of purchase.  While these forms of 
crowdfunding clearly have potential to realise socially useful goals in their own right, the 
distinctive character of the activities they facilitate places them beyond the scope of this 
article.  As Sam Ridler (Interview 6/11/14), Executive Director of the P2P Finance 
Association (P2PFA) notes, P2P lending is not the same as crowdfunding because ‘there 
are entirely different motivations in the model’.  
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The UK P2P market is dominated by four firms: Funding Circle, Market Invoice, 
Ratesetter, and Zopa.  Until 2010, these four platforms had a 100 per cent market share, 
and as of January 2016, still accounted for around 70 per cent of the market.4  The 
cumulative total of funds lent across the sector stood at just below £5.5 billion in 
January 2016, having risen from a cumulative total of just over £1 billion in January 
2014 and a cumulative total of just over £400 million January 2013.5  While the sums 
involved are small in relation to the financial sector as a whole, the sector’s growth is 
exponential, with Morgan Stanley (2015) predicting that the UK sector will reach £15 
billion of annual origination by 2020. Such rapid growth raises inevitable questions 
about its sustainability.  For instance, it remains to be seen whether P2P lending will be 
able to continue enjoying the competitive advantage over the banking sector it has had 
in a post-crisis context defined by a low central bank interest rate, although P2P 
operators are optimistic on this point. Ryhdian Lewis (Interview 11/07/13), founder 
and Chief Executive of Ratesetter, for instance, suggested ‘banks have relative 
advantages over us and we have relative advantages over banks’, such that ‘even in a 
steady state situation when interest rates are normalised […] we are still going to be 
seriously competitive’.   
 
However, in order for P2P lending to continue to grow, participation in P2P lending 
must be normalised as a form of financial practice in the eyes of consumers.  Thus far, it 
has benefitted from being, and has actively marketed itself as, a substitute for bank-
based finance when market conditions limit access to credit and offer negative real 
savings-rates. Yet as Lewis (ibid) notes, ‘there is still a stage where people need to begin 
to hear that this makes sense [and that] it is a perfectly fine thing to do.’  This difficulty, 
as is often the case in matters of money and credit, is a problem related to the 
                                                        
4 http://www.altfi.com/data/indices/UKvolume 
5 http://www.altfi.com/data/indices/UKvolume 
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development of trust between counter-parties.  This trust is something that the UK P2P 
sector is still in the process of developing. 
 
As The National Endowment for Science, Technology, and Arts (Nesta) (2013a, 3) 
states in its report on Funding Circle, the investor base is narrow and typically made up 
of those who are ‘male, highly educated and relatively wealthy, with a science, business 
or finance degree’, and an expansion of the sector is contingent on perceptions of 
security among a broader base of investors.  However, such perceptions have not been 
broadly adopted.  For instance, one recent survey by the consumer advice service 
uSwitch (2014) suggested that 84 per cent of savers were wary of lending through a P2P 
platform.  Media representations have not assisted in expanding the potential pool of 
investors using P2P platforms, as various outlets emphasised the lack of regulation in 
the sector, and in particular the fact that it is not covered by the Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme (FSCS) (e.g. Cambridge News 2013; What Investment 2014; 
Dunkley 2014).  As one article phrased it, ‘the biggest concern […] is that as yet no P2P 
lender is covered by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme [and] that unlike 
banks and building societies, should the lender go under, you won’t be compensated’ 
(Cambridge News 2013). The same uSwitch (2014) survey found that 39 per cent of 
respondents identified a lack of regulation as their major concern.   
 
This debate about regulating the sector is interesting, particularly because concerns 
about coverage under the FSCS are anachronistic since P2P lending platforms are not 
themselves lenders, but brokers.  This distinction is significant because the limited social 
demand for regulation of the sector that has been evident was based on a 
misunderstanding of what P2P lenders do.  As Andrew Mullinger, co-founder of 
Funding Circle (Interview 20/5/13) noted, ‘as we are not a lender and contracts are 
between the lender and the borrower, in the unlikely event that Funding Circle went out 
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of business those contracts would stand and there would be no greater risk of default by 
borrowers.’   Zopa likewise notes that contracts it arranges between lenders and 
borrowers would stand should it cease to trade and that  
 
while your money is waiting to be lent out it is held in a trust account at RBS, 
which remains entirely separate from the Zopa business.  This means that if 
RBS were to fail, any money you have in the trust account is covered by the 
FSCS guarantee.  (This is Money 2014) 
 
On this view, then, regulation can play an important role in normalising participation in 
P2P lending by endorsing it as a reputable and secure financial practice.  This position 
has been reflected in the fact that the UK market leaders have expressed qualified pro-
regulation views.  Andrew Mullinger (Interview 30/5/13) of Funding Circle, for 
instance, noted that his firm ‘is very much in favour of having its activities incorporated 
into the regulatory framework where regulation is appropriate and proportionate, 
because this will be extremely beneficial in building the kind of trust that is necessary for 
platforms such as ours to succeed’.  Rhydian Lewis (Interview 11/7/13) likewise noted 
that Ratesetter sees an important place for regulation, because it ‘will give more 
confidence, the fact that there’s a hygiene factor’, and that as a result it favoured 
regulation because ‘ultimately […] people expect it [and] the right regulation does add 
value and is the right thing to do.’   
 
Similarly, the CEO of Zopa, Giles Andrews (Interview 23/7/13) has said that Zopa has 
been calling for regulation because ‘on balance, we think it will be a net good’, and is 
hoping that any problems regulation causes for P2P operators will be ‘less than the 
benefit they gain.’  In particular, he noted that even in a general context where public 
trust in regulatory authorities has been shaken by the crisis, there is still a dominant 
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tendency for people to trust regulated financial products over non-regulated financial 
products (ibid.).  He also noted that there was an acceptance that  
 
at some point someone will say you can’t have an activity on this scale, with this 
much consumer money involved which isn’t regulated … We thought we ought 
to try really hard to be ahead of the curve on that one, try and pre-empt it and 
be in a position where we are proactive in trying to get the right regulation and 
not just reactive (ibid.).   
 
The positions of the three leading firms, constituting 99.98 percent market share of the 
P2P marketplace at the time regulatory processes began, can therefore be described as 
pro-regulation.  Moreover, these firms were also keen on taking a proactive approach in 
order to ensure that any regulation imposed was not stifling.  As Rhydian Lewis 
(Interview 11/7/13) noted, ‘the impetus [for regulation] has come from the industry’, 
because ‘in January 2012 we were told by the government the industry was too small 
and understandably they were worried in a period of great innovation of regulating too 
early.’  It is clear, therefore, that there was a firm intention on the part of P2P lending 
platforms to shape the form of the industry’s regulation.   
 
This intention was substantially realised, as the early regulation of P2P lending platforms 
occurred largely because of sustained and effective lobbying on behalf of the P2PFA 
(2011), which was formed in August 2011. The P2PFA focused on protecting the 
industry’s consumers by setting targets for capital reserves to cover operational risk and 
advocating prudence in the assessment of credit risk on behalf of lenders.  The P2PFA’s 
self-regulation also included commitment to comply with anti-fraud measures, and 
aimed to ensure that firms made adequate arrangements for the management of 
customer complaints, and the orderly run-down of any firm that ceases to operate.   
 16 
Following the establishment of the P2PFA, Giles Andrews (Interview 23/7/13) 
suggested that, ‘on balance we think regulation will be a net good [and hope it will] 
formalise everything we do already […] while giving us some kind of tick saying we are 
responsible’.   
 
In essence, FCA regulation introduced in April 2014 has attempted to amend existing 
consumer finance protection rules to incorporate P2P lending (FCA 2014a, 64).  This 
approach is viewed as appropriate given that the three largest P2P platforms in the UK 
operated according to the ‘client segregated account’ business model, in which all funds 
from lenders and borrowers are separated from the platform’s own balance sheet (Kirby 
and Worner 2014, 17).  Essentially, the FCA (2014a, 13) has produced rules for P2P 
platforms all designed around pre-existing consumer protection standards and the 
content of the regulations bears a strong resemblance to the program of self-regulation 
that the UK’s leading P2P platforms had been advocating. 
 
Significantly, the FCA (2014b, 6) report on the consultation period for crowdfunding 
regulation noted that new rules on capital requirements were the ‘principal concern’ of 
respondents.  This position was to ensure that firms hold a minimum amount of 
regulatory capital so ‘they behave prudently in monitoring and managing business and 
financial risks’ (FCA 2014b, 6-7).  However respondents to the consultation, including a 
number of P2P platforms, are reported to have ‘felt that the proposed requirements 
were too high or suggested an alternative calculation method’ (FCA 2014b, 7).  Notably 
the FCA (2014b, 20) amended its approach so as to lower capital requirements for P2P 
lending firms, while also stressing its commitment to a prudential regime ‘that is not 
overly complex […] especially as we are designing a regime for firms that are new to 
prudential standards’.   
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This aspect of FCA regulation reflects the P2P platforms’ concern that regulation not be 
overly burdensome.  Another area in which FCA regulation has reflected the existing 
practices of current P2P lenders is the new regimes’ requirement that platforms make 
arrangements to ensure that loans continue to be administered should a P2P lending 
platform cease to trade (FCA 2014b, 27).  In essence, this FCA (2014b, 28) stipulation is 
light-touch, with the rule merely requiring that platforms ‘take reasonable steps’ to put 
these arrangements in place as part of a ‘proportionate framework’, which ‘balances 
regulatory costs against benefits’.  The regulator is thus not setting prescriptive 
obligations that firms must fulfil, but rather allowing them ‘to design systems and 
controls that are appropriate to the needs of their business model and consumers’ (FCA 
2014b, 28).  Such a light-touch approach was also evident in the regulator’s introduction 
of a ‘disclosure-based regime’ that requires all communications from P2P lending 
platforms are ‘fair, clear and not misleading.’  Notably, it does not ‘consider it 
appropriate to mandate specific disclosures or the form and content of those disclosures 
since business models vary across the market’ (FCA 2014b, 31).  Nor does it ‘ban 
specific terms of disclosure practices’ as long as firms only use terms such as ‘protected’ 
or ‘secure’ when this is not misleading’ (FCA 2014b, 31).  In the absence of prescriptive 
practice, there is little sense in which these rules are likely to stifle existing practices of 
P2P platforms in the UK.   
 
Perhaps of most importance was the FCA’s (2014b, 18) decision not to include P2P 
platforms under the FSCS on the grounds that this move would ‘impose additional 
regulatory costs, which may be quite significant’. Despite the fact that emerging nature 
of the sector means that attempts to define it are relatively new, the position of the FCA 
on the FSCS indicates an ability to understand the nature of the activity: it is an 
appropriate response to the fact that P2P lenders do not lend themselves. In other 
words, regulators acknowledged and endorsed the P2P sectors’ view that the public 
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demand for regulation addressing issues relating to financial services compensation—
which was in any event of relatively low political salience given the size of the industry 
in 2011—was anachronistic based on a misunderstanding of the P2P sectors’ activities. 
This approach to regulation can therefore be described as having a constitutive character, 
because it endorses or ‘mainstreams’ a form of finance that emulates the traditional 
intermediary function by bringing it under the state’s regulatory umbrella.  As Jonathon 
Moules and Elaine Moore (2014) have noted, regulation provided ‘implicit backing for 
an alternative funding market eager to move beyond its image as an interesting but niche 
activity.’   
 
Both the views of market leading P2P platforms in the UK and moves towards self-
regulation, spearheaded by the P2PFA, indicate that elites operating in the sector have 
been keen to drive regulatory developments and shape their form.  As Ridler (Interview 
6/11/14) explains, ‘we were actively calling for it’, and ‘we’re very pleased it came into 
force’ as regulation was ‘very similar to what we already had as guidance for new 
platforms and for our members’.   The substantive similarity between self-regulation and 
formal regulation of the UK P2P marketplace in the context of clear intentions on the 
part of the subjects of regulation to shape its form, suggests a degree of capture as it has 
been conceptualised in the academic literature.  It is clear that the demand for regulation 
came principally from a narrow sector of society—most notably the industry itself.  This 
process occurred in a context where participation in the industry was limited to a 
relatively small sector of society making regulation a matter of low political salience, 
where there was limited understanding of the technical aspects of the industry, and 
where there was initially little appetite on the part of regulators to supply it.  As an issue 
of low political salience with a technical character where there has been reasonably 
narrow social demand for and institutional supply of regulation, the case meets many of 
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the criteria for regulatory capture outlined in the literature (Grant 2005; Mattli and 
Woods 2009; Tsingou 2009; Pagliari 2012).6   
 
3. From Regulatory Capture to Socially Useful Finance 
 
In the previous section we argued that the limited social demand for and limited 
institutional supply of regulation in the UK P2P sector meets criteria for regulatory 
capture, which is commonly associated with the ‘privileging of narrower interests (the 
“haves”) at the expense of broader interests (the “have-nots”)’ (Mattli and Woods 2009, 
16).  In this section, we suggest that while capture appears to have benefitted the 
industry by granting it reputational value by providing it with a claim ‘to formal 
legitimacy’ (Aitken, 2015, 129), that it has also contributed to realising a number of the 
socially useful goals as they have been defined by key regulators.  We discuss how the 
sector has: (1) played at least some role in sustaining demand in tight credit conditions: 
‘lubricating the flows of capital and trade’, as Turner puts it; (2) provided the basic 
function of transferring money from lenders to borrowers in such a way that essentially 
emulates traditional financial intermediation: ‘linking savers to productive investments’; 
and (3) introduced a relatively novel mechanism to refashion finance through a process 
we describe as the ‘crowdsourcing of interest rate decision making’. These claims raise 
questions about whether, under certain circumstances, it may be possible to think in 
terms of ‘constructive regulatory capture’.  We suggest that such outcomes are 
                                                        
6 One area in which the P2P sector clearly stands out in relation to this literature relates 
to its size, as many studies of capture focus on mature industries.  However, while the 
P2P sector is not a mature industry, there has been substantial private equity and 
venture capital investment in the industry which means that the lack of maturity does 
not necessarily translate into a lack of resources, which is identified as another key 
component for contributing to regulatory capture (Mattli & Woods 2009; Tsingou 2009; 
Baker 2012; Pagliari 2012; Cerny 2013)  
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contingent on our understanding of ‘social usefulness’, which requires further research, 
and could only be confirmed through historical enquiry.   
 
The first socially useful goal that can be related to the emergence and growth of P2P 
lending platforms is based on their contribution to sustaining aggregate demand 
following the GFC.  As data from the Bank of England (2014a, 4) show, lending to UK 
businesses fell from an average rate of £7.4 billion per month in 2007 to -£1.1 billion 
per month in November 2013.  For individuals, in the period to November 2013, the 
annual growth rate of consumer credit, including credit cards and other unsecured loans, 
had recovered to 3.3 per cent from lows of 1.8 per cent, -0.8 per cent and -0.3 per cent 
recorded in 2010, 2011, and 2012 respectively, however this remains some way short of 
the 4.9 per cent and 5.1 per cent rate of increase in 2007 and 2008 (ibid., 6 table 1c).   
Despite the Bank’s program of quantitative easing, which has involved its purchase of 
£375 billion of gilts in order to provide a monetary stimulus (Bank of England 2014b), 
the conjuncture since 2008 is one in which there are few outlets for borrowing for 
individuals or SMEs, concurrently stifling both investment and demand. 
 
In the context of effective zero interest rate policies set by the Bank of England and 
tight credit conditions, the economic context after the GFC clearly helped to create a 
supply of lenders eager to gain a better rate of return and borrowers who had been 
denied access to affordable credit elsewhere.  These circumstances have therefore 
allowed for P2P lenders to set competitive interest rates and allowed the platforms to 
grow.  In 2013, P2P lending platforms facilitated loans to individuals and businesses in 
the amount of £480 million (P2PFA 2014).  In 2014, it was predicted that P2P lending 
to business would reach £749 million and lending to consumers £547 million (Nesta 
2014, 12), and crucially, Nesta (2014, 28) found that a third of businesses using P2P 
lending believed that they were unlikely to get funds elsewhere.  Moreover, in the first 
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three quarters of 2014, UK P2P lending provided credit to more than 62,000 consumers 
in the UK (Nesta 2014, 13).   
 
Put simply, the idea is that in providing loans to those who would otherwise not have 
had access to them, the rise of P2P lending can aptly be described as socially useful.  
This is not to suggest that the expansion of consumer credit is an a priori social good.  
Rather, it is a recognition of the fact that maintaining levels of aggregate demand in the 
economy is an essential a priori condition for avoiding economic stagnation and 
depression, in a context where the tight credit conditions that have prevailed following 
the GFC had the potential to exacerbate deflationary tendencies, and the P2P lending 
has provided an outlet to make a contribution to offsetting this tendency.  In this sense, 
the P2P marketplace can be understood to meet Turner’s objective of ‘lubricating the 
flows of capital and trade’.  
 
In turn however, tensions emerge on the grounds that the dynamics of P2P lending 
represent a consolidation of the role that financialisation plays in welfare provision and 
it could face the same set of criticisms levelled at both ‘privatised Keynesianism’ 
(Crouch 2009) and the ‘debtfare state’ models (Soederberg 2014), in which state 
provision of welfare is effectively replaced as individuals are increasingly expected to 
provide for their own well-being through participation in various kinds of financial 
markets.   However, P2P lending in the UK effectively links credit and debt relations to 
the productive economy, on both the demand and supply sides.  On the supply side, this 
is because funds available for lending are dependent on a realised surplus—the excess 
savings—of lenders.  On the demand side, borrowing is linked directly to the 
consumption of goods, services and investment, rather than investment in underlying 
assets that can be inflated unsustainably.  While the desirability of debt-financed 
consumption for debtors may be subject to debate, in this form at least it serves to 
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stimulate the productive economy by contributing to aggregate demand.  In Turner’s 
terms, this is effectively the ‘linking of savers to productive investments’.  Furthermore, 
the P2P business model, which is commission-based, means that the platforms 
themselves have an incentive to engage in sustainable lending, since in the event of 
widespread defaults, their own profits will be threatened.   
  
While the scale of P2P lending activity is currently small in relation to the whole 
financial sector, its apparent ability to ‘lubricate the flows of capital and trade’ and ‘link 
savers to productive investments’ in a way that, at this stage, appears more sustainable 
than the disintermediated finance of the 1990s and 2000s, appears to fulfil some of 
Turner and other regulator’s visions for a socially useful finance.  The P2P market place 
therefore represents a cultural challenge to the way in which finance is practiced. 
However, P2P lending cannot genuinely be described as non-capitalist—Funding Circle, 
Zopa and Ratesetter have each been backed by private equity consortia of various 
kinds—and the extent to which the industry’s reputational value appears to have been 
enhanced by the capture of regulation, suggests a strong degree of sectional influence.  
Nonetheless, the close connection between elements of this influence and socially 
beneficial outcomes more broadly defined suggest this cultural challenge to the way in 
which finance is practiced is substantial.  
 
Such a cultural challenge is perhaps even more likely in light of the way that P2P lending 
challenges existing relationships of power within finance through the relatively novel 
means by which creditor-debtor relationships are negotiated in the ways that P2P 
lending platforms facilitate, but do not execute, financial intermediation.  Until Septeber 
2015, for instance, Funding Circle allowed lenders to decide the interest rate at which 
they want to lend, while borrowers can select the best rate available from a range of 
offers. In effect, Funding Circle’s interest rates were set through a crowdsourcing 
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process in which negotiations between individuals come to reflect the prevailing market 
price of borrowing.  This system is particularly noteworthy as it offers a potential model 
of the ‘crowdsourcing of interest rate decision making’, which in a sense means that 
institutional power is minimised while local control over negotiation of contracts is 
maximised.  
 
In each case, the price of borrowing is not a function of the seigniorage privilege 
afforded to banking elites, but to the decisions of a broader range of customers.  Of 
course, P2P platforms do not operate outside of the price system.  Indeed the 
crowdsourcing of interest rate decision-making depends on a reverse auction system.  
However, as Brett Scott (2013, 222) puts it, they are ‘a world away from the centralised 
oligopoly of high street banks that refuse to disclose what they are using my money for’.  
Likewise, Nigel Dodd (2014, 316 emphasis in original) picks up on this idea by 
suggesting that P2P lending is part of the ‘progressive decentralization of money’.  Put 
simply, in this regard our claim is that the technology associated with P2P lending 
platforms offers a relatively novel means through which to negotiate the creditor-debtor 
relationship, one which could further help the sector to grow as an alternative to the 
socially useless aspects of banking.7 
 
The technological infrastructure provided by these P2P lending platforms is crucial to 
how they facilitate intermediation. On the one hand, they very much look like they are 
enabling the function of traditional banks: directing savings to productive investments.  
                                                        
7 We are grateful to a reviewer from BJPIR for emphasising the fact that the role that 
technology might play in realising ‘socially useful’ objectives, both in finance and more 
broadly, is a question that is contested by those who see the gains from recent 
technological change to be more limited than those of the second industrial revolution 
(Gordon, 2016), and those who see its potential to transcend prevailing capitalist 
structures (Mason 2015).   We agree with the reviewer that this debate is highly 
significant, and we regret that space dictates we are not able to engage more thoroughly 
with it here.   
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On the other hand, the ethos on which the whole crowdfunding movement is built 
depends on a rather different model of organisation than the image conjured up by the 
traditional banking institutions.  In general terms, ‘network-thinking’ has 
reconceptualised how hierarchies are understood and challenged.  Thus the platforms 
can be seen as a crucial nodal point in this network: facilitating lending decisions by the 
crowd, but not actually making those decisions.  In this regard, their activity essentially 
builds upon the growth of what Yochai Benkler (2006) identifies as the ‘networked 
information economy’.  This set of practices is associated with technological and 
communication advances that enable a more ‘decentralized individual action’, which 
utilises ‘radically distributed, nonmarket mechanisms that do not depend on proprietary 
strategies’ (Benkler 2006, 3).  One of the aspects of the ‘enhanced autonomy’ that the 
networked information economy brings is that people have a greater capacity to act in 
‘loose commonality with others, without being constrained to organize their relationship 
through a price system or in traditional hierarchical models of social and economic 
organization’ (Benkler 2006, 8).  Through these processes, it is possible to view the 
mainstreaming of P2P lending through regulation as a significant challenge to the power 
relations that have underscored the cultural practices of financial activity that have 
recently been described as socially useless.   
 
The extent to which this challenge constitutes an example of regulatory capture 
producing positive outcomes remains to be seen, particularly as the growth of P2P 
lending might serve broader and often problematic ‘financial inclusion’ agendas. It is 
contingent on our understanding of the social purpose of finance and could only be 
confirmed by historical enquiry.  However, where innovators in financial services—like 
P2P lenders in the UK—pursue business models that facilitate ends broadly agreed to 
be socially useful, there is a case to be made that drives to capture regulation could 
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produce constructive outcomes, especially in light of financial services’ reliance on 
‘sanctioned claims to formal legitimacy’ (Aitken 2015, 129) for their expansion. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This article has argued that regulatory capture has often been understood as a way of 
facilitating rent-seeking by financial elites, resulting in socially useless finance.  We 
argued that in the case of the regulation of P2P lending in the UK, a similar process of 
regulatory capture can be identified, but appears to be contributing to the construction 
of regulators’ views of socially useful finance by ‘lubricating the flows of capital and 
trade’, ‘linking savers to productive investments’, and facilitating the ‘crowdsourcing of 
interest rate decision-making’.  In particular, we suggested that by bringing it under the 
regulatory umbrella, the FCA contributed to mainstreaming and granting respectability 
to this form of financial activity, which has the potential to help expand the 
constituency participating in it.  In light of financial services’ reliance on the 
endorsement of the state in order to foster their expansion, it may be appropriate to 
think in terms of constructive outcomes for regulatory capture in instances where the 
goals of innovators are closely aligned with broad understandings about the ‘social 
purpose’ of finance, however that may be conceived. Our aim, of course, is not to 
endorse regulatory capture in general, but to identify some potential benefits in this 
specific case, and which will need to be the subject of historical enquiry before a 
judgement about those benefits might be authoritatively made.   
 
Despite these potential benefits, we are aware that P2P lending is not a palliative for all 
of the problems that debt relations create or for financial stability more broadly, and it is 
clear regulators need to engage with a number of other issues if they were to further 
endorse the sector in the name of socially useful finance.  For instance, the sector’s 
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reliance on credit-scoring as its primary way of assessing creditworthiness means that a 
significant proportion of the population are excluded from P2P lending, while individual 
the benefits it provides are likely to be limited to those with surplus savings.  There 
might be ways of overcoming such exclusionary practices, either through developments 
of the P2P lending system itself or the development of other kinds of social finance, 
such as credit unions, so that these benefits might be realised more broadly.  At present 
though, these are areas where further research is required.  
 
We suggest there are at least six sets of issues derived from our discussion in this article 
that should constitute the heart of a new research agenda in this increasingly significant 
area of financial activity.   
1) Conceptualising socially useful finance. Throughout this paper we have drawn on a 
definition of social usefulness outlined by regulators.  However, this definition operates 
within a narrow framework that neither clearly articulates what specific aspects of 
banking are socially useless, nor engages with the complex social relations of money.  
Both issues, we suggest, require further consideration.  
2) P2P lending infrastructures/technology.  Our notion of the crowdsourcing of interest rate 
decision making depends on the new infrastructures that P2P makes available.  As yet, 
little has been said about the political economy of these technological developments in 
relation to money and credit.   
3) Market segregation.  The crowdfunding landscape in general is evolving rapidly and to 
complement our analysis, more needs to be said about the types of business models 
available and the specific way they may, or may not, address the questions of social 
purpose we raise here.   
4) The sociality of P2P lending.  As part of this analysis, much more empirical study is 
required on the aspects of P2P lending that are labelled as ‘social’.  Indeed the label 
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‘social lending’ often applied to the sector should be deconstructed and subjected to 
sustained analysis.   
5) The historical antecedents of P2P lending.  It is often all too easy to assume because of the 
‘newness’ of the P2P infrastructures that the practices enacted on the platforms 
themselves are new, but of course they are full of historically and culturally produced 
forms of human action.  P2P lending and its potential social purpose should be located 
within this cultural history.   
6) Financialisation and P2P lending.  Finally, these practices also need to be located and 
analysed within existing discussions about the nature of money and debt, and their 
relationship to processes of financialisation in UK society more broadly.  We think as 
these issues are addressed larger questions can be asked about the potential of P2P 
lending beyond the regulatory notion of socially purposeful finance outlined here. 
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